



The Normative Impact of the Behavioral Sciences

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THE NORMATIVE IMPACT OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES*

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I. THE CLARIFICATION OF PRIMARY NORMS

THE giant strides of the physical sciences are burned into popular consciousness by the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima. The question is often raised why the behavioral sciences appear to lag so far behind. Often the plea to accelerate our knowledge of man is made with moving eloquence as a race between science and education—and catastrophe.

We do in fact know a great deal more than we did, even though it is not enough, about man in society. It is not generally understood how rapidly our knowledge has been expanding in recent years. I put the emphasis upon recent times for reasons that will be apparent when I recall a few historical facts. It was not until 1879—not quite fourscore years ago—that Wilhelm Wundt opened his tiny laboratory at the University of Leipzig and challenged every general proposition about human behavior to run the gauntlet of experimental test. Scholars of jurisprudence had already classified the available stock of travelers' tales and historical writing in the hope of settling the dispute over the "original"

structure of the family and deciphering the "Law of Nature" for the transmission of property and status. These studies provided an impetus to the organization of trips for scientific purposes, which in turn led to cultural anthropology as we know it today. The peasant cultures of Europe had already been glamorized by the romantic movement in literature and the arts. Scholars took leave of their bookshelves to go into the field and learn the vernaculars and the folklore of the "sub-Europe" dwelling apart from courts and cities. The influx of new data inspired the development of modern methods for the study of linguistics and literature, social psychology and sociology.

Governmental inquiries played an important part in fostering behavioral studies in many countries. In Great Britain the royal commissions of the early years of the nineteenth century excelled in gathering information as an aid to legislation. They created a literature of unparalleled detail depicting the new industrialism. De Tocqueville was on an official mission from the French government when he visited the United States. He was to report upon new types of penal institutions; and the diligence and thoroughness of his observation leave little to

* Lectures delivered in the fall of 1955 under the Doctor Israel Goldstein Foundation at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York City.

be desired. In interpretative vision he is unsurpassed even by his most eminent successors, not excluding James Bryce.

The expansion of the behavioral sciences in the United States has been connected with the rise of graduate instruction and research in the major universities. The epochal dates are relatively recent. In 1876 came the birth of the Johns Hopkins University, whose impact on history, economics, and political science was of first-rate importance. Clark University began in 1889, making its mark especially in psychology. A landmark was the establishment of the Faculty of Political Science at Columbia. (The Ph.D., by the way, was initiated in 1871 at Yale.)

With the growth of qualified alumni, specialized professional societies were organized, learned journals multiplied, and technical books began to issue from university and commercial presses. Field trips, laboratories, and museums became recognized research instruments. The formation of the Social Science Research Council after World War I was an important step. Some of the great private foundations established a policy of encouraging the study of man as well as materials, a policy that has been continued since World War II.

Partly as a result of the recency of this rapid expansion there is no consensus among scholars or laymen about the impact of the behavioral sciences upon the norms of society. There has been nothing quite like the fury of the controversies unleashed by Galileo in the sixteenth century or by Darwin in the nineteenth. On a lesser scale, however, the notorious "warfare between science and religion," to recall the title of a famous book, flared up in reference to Freud and other figures who made unwelcome findings about sexuality. It is a historical commonplace

that the custodians of orthodoxy in theology or in property relations have often been among the most apprehensive that the findings established by free inquiry will upset the status quo. In the modern United States, however, orthodoxy in theology or philosophy does not imply timidity in facing facts about man and society. It is significant that we have such organizations as the Conference on Science, Religion, and Philosophy.

Our attempt to sum up the normative impact of the behavioral sciences will be limited in scope and tentative in tone. The fact is that the impact is amenable to study by the methods brought into use by the behavioral sciences. Unfortunately, however, the problem has not been exhaustively dealt with in these terms. It is not too much to say that we are engaged in prolegomena to such an inquiry.

The present exposition deals successively with the impact of the behavioral sciences on (1) the clarification of primary norms, (2) the choice of sanctioning norms, and (3) the procedures of insight and understanding.

Behavioral scientists take an active hand in the life of our times and have many opportunities to affect the formulation and application of norms. Some are decision-makers in great affairs, emulating political scientist Woodrow Wilson, or political economist Mackenzie King. (In the United States the legal profession continues to excel other professions in practical affairs; but a legal training does not necessarily, or even typically, include a working knowledge of the methods and findings of the behavioral sciences.) It is common for economists, political scientists, or sociologists to occupy administrative posts. And they are often used as advisers, for example, on the President's Council of Economic Ad-

visers and on innumerable commissions at international, state, and local levels. Some behavioral scientists go beyond the advisory to the promotional role for the purpose of enlisting popular support.

When we take into account all the direct and indirect influences that the behavioral sciences have exercised on society, what shall we select as of special importance? I suggest that the most permeating impact appears to be in clarifying the primary norms of society. Normative problems confront legislators at every level on practically every issue. No constitutional convention, no session of a legislature, can possibly fail to cope, however indirectly, with the goal values of the community as a whole. We do not imply, of course, that questions of this kind are a monopoly of government, whether local, state, national, or international. Normative issues are particularly prominent among constitution-makers and legislators for private associations. The ruling organs of our professional societies, or our ecclesiastical organizations, wrestle with these matters whenever they draft or apply codes of conduct.

We face normative issues when we try to make explicit the principles that unify the roles we play in the social process. In the world of government we are voters or officials. In the market place we are consumers and producers. We play roles of high, middle, or low status in the social class structure of society. So far as health is concerned, we give or receive medical care and advice. In the exercise of skill we are outstanding, mediocre, or poor performers (whether we have professional or recreational techniques in mind). As a family member or a friend we engage in a maze of human relations. Concerning some subjects we spread enlightenment; and on many topics we have access to

enlighteners. As persons who take life seriously we try to unify our conduct in a consistent and responsible pattern.

In his role as a scientist the behavioral scientist is only indirectly concerned with the normative consequences of what he does. He sees himself as a specialist who describes human interactions and tries to explain them. He is fully aware of the fact that all activities are interdependent and that any act of description and explanation will have consequences, of which one is to strengthen or weaken the primary norms of individuals, private associations, or communities. He is, of course, equipped to investigate the impact of descriptive knowledge upon normative patterns.

THE DISCOVERY OF MULTIPLE VALUES

Despite the lack of conscious plan, it is, I think, possible to show that the cumulative net result of behavioral research has been compatible with the ideal norms of our civilization. Behavioral findings emphasize the importance in human affairs of "human" values, such as affection and respect, and reduce the stress that has been put upon "wealth" or "material factors."

The highest social ideal of European tradition is the dignity of man, the ultimate realization of a world community in which human dignity is realized in theory and fact. Despite the inclusiveness of this ideal conception, modern man has been remarkably preoccupied with talking and thinking in terms of wealth and of material values generally. This is reflected in systematic theories that have been put forward to account for human behavior. The first science of man to take modern form was economics, the science of wealth. Strictly speaking, economic analysis is descriptive, seeking to explain the magnitudes of

production, saving, investment, consumption, and price. As an aid in this enterprise a theoretical model was constructed of the "economic man," who was assumed to maximize economic gain and to minimize economic loss. Many changes in the market as a whole seem to move in harmony with this model of the hypothetical calculator. When a sharp upturn occurs in the volume of a given product, the price per unit usually goes down.

While the theoretical model of an economic man was devised for explanatory purposes, this was often overlooked. Although competent experts took it for granted, less expert minds might assume that the pursuit of gain was being recommended as well as described or even that the "economic man" was assumed to be a complete man, or at least an especially admirable man. On the other hand, the business calculator was under attack by socialists or Communists. It was alleged that in the present epoch he could no longer make efficient use of the material instruments of production.

Behavioral studies have quietly undermined the overestimations implied in capitalist or Marxist analyses. Many of the researches carried out by behavioral scientists in factories and offices have rediscovered the role of congeniality and intimacy in human affairs. Let me cite a well-known example. During the war a plant in the aircraft industry piled up a notoriously bad record for erratic production. There was nothing wrong about pay scales, which were high and attractive. Working conditions were rather good, since the buildings were new and clean. Living conditions and transportation to and from the plant were no worse than in operations in the same area with much better records. Field studies by behavioral scientists got to the root of

the matter, which was neglect by management of one of the "human" factors. No attention had been given to cultivating work teams of congenial people. The individual was a light bulb who might be screwed into any convenient socket. From the earliest training procedures through to the assignment of tasks no one considered the human tie. So extreme was the situation that, the moment some continuity was preserved among work teams, the effects on production were exceedingly favorable. Spoilage, absenteeism, stoppages, and turnover were sharply reduced. It became obvious that congeniality (affection) was a significant value in human affairs.

Another "human value" is respect. Behavioral studies have brought it also into focus. For people to believe in what they are doing makes a vast difference. The point was given convincing though inadvertent demonstration in one of the now famous researches guided by the late Elton Mayo. The initial aim of the investigation was to show the importance of congenial human relations in industry. The experimental task force was a group of workers engaged in a semiskilled operation. At first, results were negative in that they showed many of the changes to which importance was then attached by some managers and industrial psychologists to be of relatively little importance. Rest periods, for instance, were reduced and varied as to length and timing throughout the day; yet the curve of group production continued to go up. The curve rose year after year as the members of the task force derived increasing satisfactions in life. Production continued to rise until the Great Depression was well under way, when at last the workers lost confidence in the importance of what they were doing. They had come

to respect the experiment as a significant contribution not only to life in the plant to which they were attached but to the general improvement of industrial relations. Over the years they had become accustomed to visitors from far and near who were brought to the workroom by the top brass of the company. Not long after the onset of the depression harried executives failed to visit as much as before, and a general sense of futility and disenchantment led to the first downward turn in output.

Another set of behavioral studies has indicated how access to enlightenment figures as a "human" value. It is no news to philosophers or educators that man has a mind and that its use is a highly valued activity, no matter how debased any specific preoccupation may appear to be. Behavioral research has demonstrated the significance of possessing a map to clarify a situation. In certain plants, for instance, the relations between the working force and management were bitter. The workers were sure that the penurious policies of the company reflected only tight-fistedness. But these attitudes changed when the workers were informed of the precarious competitive position of the firm and of the probability that new products soon to go into quantity production would improve things. These disclosures, which relied upon a policy of shared enlightenment, altered the situation. In a world of mass media and mass instruction the importance of a policy of enlightenment would seem obvious to all. Yet only the cumulative weight of study and experience can form a new consensus among owners, managers, and trade-union leaders.

Behavioral studies have also given us a more stable estimate of the significance of another value, the demand for skill (and taste). This is the demand to help

latent talent mature into socially accepted forms of expression and to find opportunities for the exercise of improved capability. The regrading of a labor force often produces remarkable examples of round pegs who have been in square holes and who are productive and happy when they are at last put in a round hole (even when it does not yield the biggest pay check). Through the years our psychologists have developed methods of testing that disclose latent talent and enable society as a whole to benefit by cutting down the waste of human potential.

It may be that the most notable outcome of modern research is in documenting the role played by norms of right and wrong (the rectitude value). Attention has been directed to the consequences that may follow when a sense of guilt is unconscious and carries childhood conflicts and misinterpretations into adult life. Modern research has shown the frequency with which unadmitted and unrecognized appraisals of the guilty self provoke defense against needed insight and understanding. A person trying to defend himself against self-indictment is commonly self-righteous, censorious, and aggressive. We encounter personalities of this kind in all walks of life. As managers they complicate industrial relations, which under modern conditions usually depend upon a wide, co-operative network. Such persons find it difficult to function smoothly among equals. When we look for the source of difficulty, we find that it lies in the readiness with which adverse appraisals of the self can be aroused, and against which "defense measures" are taken. One of these is the common device of treating the other person as the guilty party. Such "misplaced moralism" appears to be a pervasive element in American civilization, at least,

and perhaps of European culture as a whole. It poses the question how the demand to take life seriously can be transmitted from one generation to the next without becoming contaminated by hostilities masked as feelings of self-righteousness.

That people attach different degrees of importance in life to physical comfort, safety, and health is a commonplace of experience. Nonetheless, several implications have been brought into the open as behavioral studies become more searching. Two besetting problems of industrial management are accidents and absenteeism. Research is demonstrating that a person's conscious demand for well-being may be nullified on the unconscious level by a demand to endure physical deprivation. I am referring to the vast continent, relatively new to modern medicine, of "psychosomatic" disorder. We speak of headaches, backaches, gastrointestinal upsets, and the like as psychosomatic when they are related to a problem of conduct rather than to organic processes relatively independent of these problems. It would be more correct to speak of "sociopsychosomatic" upsets instead of "psychosomatic," since the truly relevant context is the social situation constituted by managers and men, of workmates, of family members. When people are confronted by acute problems of conduct, they often impose deprivations upon themselves (accidents or neglect of hygienic precautions). A typical sequence is this: (1) a deprivation is imposed upon A in a social situation, as when a foreman or workmate displays contempt or indifference toward him; (2) A has a strong impulse to damage the offending person, and this arouses guilt feelings for having hostile impulses and fear of retaliation; (3) A imposes a deprivation upon himself by failing to listen

to a warning bell or by neglecting to get out of a draft and "catching cold."

Behavioral studies have given prominence to another value, namely, power, by demonstrating the importance of the demand to have a part in the making of significant decisions. The failure to share power with organizations of workers has often led to industrial difficulties. The most instructive conflicts are those occurring in "model" industrial towns. Despite facilities in the form of homes, parks, churches, hospitals, schools, libraries, and reasonable wages, the workers often rebel. Comparative study indicates that the clue to rebellion is in the sphere of respect and power. Workers feel that they are not being treated as fully adult and that they are denied a voice in what concerns them most. The unforgettable words of the Pullman workers of many years ago are typical of rebellion against paternalistic management: "We are born in a Pullman house, taught in a Pullman school, confirmed in a Pullman church, exploited in a Pullman shop, and when we die we'll be buried in a Pullman grave and go to a Pullman hell!"

The implication of behavioral research, then, is that the life of society is significantly affected by the pursuit of other values than wealth. People are motivated by demands for affection and respect, skill and enlightenment, rectitude, well-being, and power. This leads to the inference that norms of thinking and talking in our civilization have given one-sided emphasis to the material component. Corporate managers are legally required to make money for the stockholders. They must justify their disposition of corporate assets in such terms. The existence of the legal standard encourages the use of a "dollar" vocabulary for every problem, whether dollars are

especially important or not. In this way a manager seeks to demonstrate his claim to be "hardheaded" and hence "trustworthy." The result has been to overlabel the psychological and social process as "economic" and to disregard the facts of multiple motivation at conscious or unconscious levels.

In the perspective provided by the emerging map of human relations previous interpretations by scholars as well as men of affairs appear to be singularly one-sided. When "materialism" was in flower, scholars lost an opportunity to criticize prevailing dogma effectively. As recently as the early decades of the present century the most articulate and creative historians in the United States were champions of the "economic interpretation of history." In the perspective of the intellectual life of the West this vogue was rather belated, since the tools of capitalist and Marxist analysis had been around for decades. At the turn of the century the technical methods by which personality and culture could be intensively investigated were in a relatively primitive state. The impact of the behavioral sciences had not begun to make itself felt; and it is not the modern function of historians to take the lead in the use of interpretative categories. It will take time for the equivalents of Charles A. Beard or Carl Becker or William E. Dodd to give popular resonance to the role of multiple value perspectives and operations in the rise of this or any other civilization.

It will come to be recognized that one of the major limitations of modern European civilization was the failure to be enlightened about "human" values. There was, of course, a vast concourse of specialists on the great tradition of human dignity. They occupied positions of influence in the religious and philosophi-

cal institutions of every national community. And they did not fail to proclaim the importance of love and neighborliness in the lives of men. As we look back at the spectacle, it appears that there must have been some inner limitation upon the release of creativeness in facing "human" problems. In the midst of a communications revolution, the specialists continued to rely upon customary modes of sermonizing, exhorting, and admonishing. These intellectual tools were too dull to demonstrate the role of "human" factors. More effective communication was needed to carry understanding to decisive figures in government, political parties, and pressure groups.

It is scarcely too much to say that the crises of modern industrialism have been crises of respect or, more generally, of human dignity, of failure to foster a more speedy and effective sharing of fundamental values. The periods of mass unemployment in western Europe that were precipitated by industrial interdependence were seldom crises of starvation. But they always wounded human dignity, since in effect they told millions of people that they had no recognized place in the world. The diffusion of industrialism around the globe carried an avalanche of deprivation with it. It left a trail of animosity among former colonial peoples that threatens the continuity of European civilization and the security of mankind.

Although behavioral studies are drawing a new map of sociopersonal relations, it is not to be supposed that they are offering new interpretations of the religious or metaphysical sources of social values. Meticulous theologians and philosophers try to keep the grounding of human values distinct from the scientific task of explaining the human factors that operate

to condition the acceptance or rejection of a value (or value interpretation). In western Europe, at least, the attribution of worth to the individual was profoundly affected by religion and metaphysics. But the matter-of-fact role of behavioral scientists does not allow them as scientists to commit themselves on questions relating to the "transempirical" derivation of social values. As we noted before, even the support given to multiple values has been a by-product of description and explanation.

THE DEMAND TO SPECIFY AND CONTEXTUALIZE

More particularly, how do the behavioral sciences come to affect the primary norms of society? The most subtle impact is an outcome of the demand to specify and "contextualize." Our primary norms are traditionally formulated in historic symbols like "human dignity," "justice," or "freedom." Key terms of this kind are not immediately comprehensible in reference to concrete social situations. If the legislator asks the behavioral scientist to report on the trends toward more or less "freedom," the scientist does not take it for granted that the term is clearly understood simply because it is commonly used. He asks for specification. Once specific definitions are agreed to, the scientist can report on the degree of free government in Japan, for example, or on the balance of competition and monopoly in the automobile market.

The act of specification is a discipline whose typical result is to clarify the norms of those who submit to it. And I use the word "discipline" advisedly. Practical politicians are rhetoricians, and, as specialists on persuasive presentation, they are expert in acceptable ambiguity. The demand to specify for pur-

poses of research is an interruption in the flow of rhetoric; and it is not always a welcome intrusion. But the behavioral scientist is constrained by his methods of work to keep doggedly at it until words of ambiguous reference are turned into signposts. The result is to clarify the idea of actual or potential agreement in the understanding of primary norms.

Many specifications arouse no dissent among rational friends of freedom. No one, for instance, would propose a single, self-perpetuating, all-powerful dictator as a satisfactory specification of "democracy." But social institutions offer subtle gradations. And they occur in infinitely various contexts. In some contexts the net impact of an institutional practice not otherwise objectionable turns out to be damaging. A problem arises when a political or economic practice, for instance, appears to cripple the family, organized religion, or some other institution to which we attach favorable evaluation.

It is the contextual function of behavioral methods to bring these conflicts into the open and in this way to foster the critical consideration of specific definitions. Thus the changing relationships that occur in the social process are kept at the focus of attention as a warning and a guide to judgment. We may keep our terms and intentions immutable through time. But it is important to complete our fundamental orientation by frequently reassessing the specifics that apply to the developing context.

As a brief exercise we may consider one of the few attempts that have been made officially to clarify social goals on a world scale. I refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was voted by the United Nations Assembly in 1948. As political observers we are too experienced to take this document at its face

value as an effective prescription binding throughout the world community. It is notable mainly as an ideological gesture toward formulating the ideal in the name of which the contending elites of the world speak up. The Declaration is a point of departure for a long process of development in which there must be common motivations before there can be common understanding. Even with a degree of motivation to agree, there are genuine intellectual difficulties with problems of specification and of contextual appraisal. Issues of this kind can in part be resolved in the light of observations made by objective methods upon the operation of specific institutional practices.

What is involved in the clarifying process can be exhibited by conducting an examination of the Declaration of Human Rights. We will look at its provisions as they relate to the eight value-institution processes into which we analyze the social process as a whole.

In reference to *well-being* we find that the Declaration speaks of the right to "life, liberty and security of person" and condemns "torture," as well as "cruel" or "inhuman" treatment or punishment. There is a "right to rest and leisure" and a general right to "social security."

The Declaration deals also with *affection* and specifies the "right to marry and to found a family" and to engage in congenial association with others (the right to "peaceful assembly and association"). And there is the right to be identified with a national community ("right to a nationality").

In a sense the whole document is concerned with *respect*, but, since we have used "human dignity" as the general term, we are free to give a more limited meaning to "respect" and to use it to designate the giving and receiving of

signs of deference. The first article affirms that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and right." "Everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms . . . without distinction of any kind." Obviously, there must be no "slavery or servitude," no arbitrary interference with "privacy, family, home or correspondence," and freedom from attacks upon "honor and reputation."

Power is to be shared. There is the right to "take part in the government," to "recognition as a person before the law," to "equal protection before the law," and to "effective remedy by competent national tribunals." The Declaration enumerates some criteria of fair trial and affirms a right of asylum. And there is a right to "a social and international order."

In reference to *wealth* the Declaration supports the "right to own property" and to a "standard of living adequate for the well-being" of the individual and his family.

The Declaration deals with *enlightenment*, "freedom of opinion and expression" and the right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

We also find that *skill* (and taste) are included in the Declaration. There is the "right to work, to free choice of employment," and "to protection against unemployment." "Everyone has a right to education" and "the right to participate freely in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."

And *rectitude* is a recognized value. The Declaration speaks of "freedom of thought, conscience and religion." "Everyone has duties to the community," and there is no right to destroy the rights and freedoms of others.

This is a forthright beginning on the

world scale. It brings into one magistral formulation some of the clarifications needed to bring basic "terms of ambiguous reference" into closer connection with concrete circumstances. But reflection will immediately suggest how far this instrument is from providing a working charter for a free commonwealth, even if we assume specific unity of purpose throughout the globe (an assumption, unhappily, to which we cannot subscribe). Not specified is the degree of executive power in reference to the legislature or the courts or the electorate or the division between the institutions of central and local government. Unclear are the permissible degrees of monopoly in the private or public organizations that feed or control the marketing process. Unsettled are the content of the mass media of enlightenment and the meaning of obscenity or libel.

If any ten or twenty of us were to constitute ourselves an informal commission of citizens to arrive at a clarified model of the community toward which we aspire, the undertaking would be arduous and long drawn out. And the problem would be more difficult if we were to enlarge the scope of the undertaking to include citizens of all accessible nations. As components of mankind confront themselves with norm-clarifying tasks of this kind, they contribute something, however slight, to the mind-clearing and institution-building challenge that confronts thoughtful and responsible people everywhere. In such enterprises they can draw to some extent, and hopefully to an increasing extent, upon descriptive and explanatory data and analysis.

Let us use a brief example of the way in which investigation may yield pertinent knowledge about how various factors are interconnected. The Declaration has little to say about the norms that re-

late to marriage. Scientists in their specialized capacity do not argue about the transempirical claims that are made on behalf of "divorce" or "no divorce." But the social consequences of various patterns of divorce can be described. And claims are often made that "divorce is destructive (or not destructive) of the psychological integration of the children." Champions of "no divorce" frequently assert that broken homes mean broken lives (for the children). And there are investigations that tend to confirm this. But there are studies that point in the opposite direction, reporting that the policy of "no divorce" frequently wrecks lives by exposing children to hostile parents. In the light of such information men and women of good will may revise their stand and cease trying to settle the issue "by definition" rather than "by definitions disciplined by inquiry." They may favor the dissolution of the marriage bond only when the evidence shows that the children are suffering serious damage from the parental environment.

What I have said about the interplay of fact and norm in regard to the institution of marriage applies to every social practice. Behavioral inquiry can show how any specific practice affects any other and how the practice is, in turn, conditioned. Behavioral science supplies the methods by which the working specifications of human dignity can be continually reassessed in the light of cumulative knowledge of the context in which they occur, and in which they interact.

We may be sure that the slow assembling of results will rarely create a sudden and clear image of human affairs. It is more likely that the image will continue to shine through a glass darkly and that ardent minds and hearts will continue to fill out in faith and hope the evidence of things not seen. The beam of

scientific inquiry will continue to disclose patches of fact and fragments of explanation that will receive automatic approval from those whose normative interpretations appear to be supported and automatic disapprobation from the defenders of norms which appear to be cast in the shadow. And there will continue to be a middle spectrum drawing its members from many quarters. There will be some who swing with the topical and the fashionable and who rally round the popular or the snobbish versions of a norm. Others will adopt a genuine posture of inquiry and seek to distinguish between the rather permanent features of human dignity and the interpretations that depend upon particular configurations of culture, class, crisis, and personality.

In sexual relations, for example, a mixed reception will continue to be the rule. Think of the mixed response to the finding that the more cultivated (upper class) members of the community engage in a greater diversity of sexual expression than the lower classes. Or the reports that drinking habits are more influenced by social class than by ethnic or ecclesiastical tradition. Or preliminary studies that found that the intellectual brilliance of a child is crucially affected by such narrowly specific determiners as whether the nursing figure in the early environment uses language to the infant during feeding periods.

Our findings about human relationships are often accepted with some grumbling because they appear to lack the elegance of the ultra-short or the ultra-

long, the ultra-fast or the ultra-slow, the ultra-near or the ultra-far. They often tell us who was doing what yesterday, plus some of the explanations why. But these findings are about *us*. It is wise not to ignore what we have, or what we can get, but to squeeze it for all it is capable of yielding of human understanding and insight.

Potentially there is a social technique of benefiting from various kinds of knowledge. It is within our province to improve the methods and the findings of the behavioral sciences. And it is not beyond our acumen to improve our technique of assessing the presumptive significance of whatever intelligence reports our behavioral scientists are able to add to our stock of layman-like observation, practical sagacity, or scholarly information. That the impact to date has been to foster the norms of a multivalued society must be regarded as largely unplanned, fortunate though it is. But there is no ground for asserting that in the long run our conceptions of human dignity are too fragile to survive descriptive knowledge, or the rigorous specification of meaning, or contextual modes of inquiry.

The issues that arise in connection with primary norms gain sharpness when we confront the sanctioning norms. A sanctioning norm prescribes what shall be done to those who deviate from a primary norm. It is our expectation that, by considering sanctions, we shall further illuminate the questions that have arisen in connection with the primary prescriptions of an individual or of society as a whole.

II. THE CHOICE OF SANCTIONING NORMS

EVERY act that deviates from a primary norm poses a problem of sanction. What shall be done to the offender? Who shall do it? How shall it be done? It is often assumed that sanctions are exclusively punitive. The punitive approach is in fact old and persistent. It is the practice of retaliation, of "an eye for an eye." But it is not the only method of protecting a norm. It is possible to be positive as well as negative. By rewarding good conduct, we may deter a potential offender by directing attention to the advantages of conformity. A sanctioning system may go far enough to take an affirmative responsibility for reconstructing the personality of an offender, making medical and psychological treatment available for the purpose. And a system may try to modify the number of provocative situations in the community. In a word, sanctioning strategy can be versatile and highly selective, a conception that owes a great deal to the cumulative impact of the behavioral sciences.

When a primary norm is under consideration, the sanctioning problem soon appears. We know that an act of legislation at the national, state, or local level usually has sanctioning provisions. It is no news to an experienced legislator that it is easier to put words into statutes than to put statutes into practice. The same truth applies to the "legislative" activity of private groups. All voluntary associations—in business, education, medical care, or what-not—meet the sanctioning issue. No trade association, professional society, or trade union fails to reckon on some degree of non-conforming behavior. The general assem-

blies, synods, presbyteries, or congregations that perform the legislative function in the government of churches always assume the occurrence of disciplinary cases. In political life pressure groups are organized to influence legislators, administrators, or even courts; and they are beset with the disciplinary questions common to every human association. Political parties are harassed by the frictions of non-conformity, especially when they profess a distinctive ideology. Of all human associations, the most distinctive sanctioning problems arise in the family, since disciplinary questions are inseparable from the task of harmonizing the conduct of the young with the norms of the old.

Current ways of thinking about sanctioning issues have been cumulatively influenced by the behavioral sciences. We are in a period of innovation, and part of what I have to say is forecast rather than report. I shall put the emphasis first upon the clarity that has resulted from the growth of knowledge about various categories of offenders. I speak of deviations affected by calculated risk, cultural diversity, unconscious drives, immaturity, ignorance, and organic defect.

DEVIATIONS BASED UPON CALCULATED RISK

The adults in a given society may deviate from norms as a calculated risk of gain. B deliberately chooses not to perform a contractual obligation to A because B has a chance to sell to better advantage to C. B may add to the cost of doing business whatever penalties are assessed against him if A goes to court.

Similarly, D may wrong E by failing to instal accident-prevention equipment. From D's point of view he takes some risk in order to keep down production costs. Since we respect private arrangements in our society, officials of the community take no part in private controversies until one or the other party brings the issue to court. In many situations, of course, it is community policy to step in at once when an offense appears to have been committed and to act against the offender. This occurs when a "crime" is involved.

A great many offenses which are nominal violations of community policy arouse no indignation in the community at large. If the offender gets caught and pays a penalty, he expects to resume his ordinary round of activity without having to struggle against the opprobrium of his neighbors. Presumably, he will benefit enough from his experience to stay out of trouble in the future or at least to operate with more realistic expectations about how to "get away with" a violation. Behavioral studies are continually bringing to light categories of offense that once invoked indignation and that have passed into a "cost of doing business." Studies of embezzlement show that bank clerks, building superintendents, and other persons who make away with their employers' funds receive a relatively light penalty nowadays. Jurors evidently feel that these employees are more exposed to temptation than the rest of us and that employers are at fault in failing to pay higher salaries. Whatever the explanation, these "white-collar" offenders are dealt with rather leniently.

But the trend of sentiment in modern civilization is not always in favor of leniency. Genuine feeling is stirred up by

drunken driving and the peddling of dope. Some offenses continue to arouse opprobrium today as they have in the past (notably arson).

Actual and potential offenders on the basis of calculated risk are responsive to a system of rewards and penalties of the kind usually provided in penal legislation. Behavioral studies show that in many national or local communities enforcement, severity of effective penalty, and frequency of offense are interdependent. Since public officials almost invariably operate with lower appropriations than they want or need, police chiefs and other enforcement officers, when they proceed rationally, estimate the relative results of multiplying traffic squads or park patrols.

Offenders on the basis of "expediency" commit more violations as they become more sanguine about the prospects of gain (and penalties do not nullify the contemplated gain). This simple yet fundamental proposition often explains the seasonality of breaches of public order. When cold weather sets in, overcoats bring more on the market; and we are not surprised if more overcoats are stolen and disposed of through "fences" at a "profit." And cold weather increases the demand for immediate consumption. Overcoats are wanted for one's family, and the result is more overcoats stolen for personal use. Research is continually discovering factors that affect the timing and intensity of incentives to deviate from community norms. Social crises modify the balance of calculation in predictable ways. Periods of prosperity exhibit other distinctive patterns of violation (as do depressions). The early, middle, and terminating phases of long wars exhibit characteristic breaches of the norms that relate to persons and property.

DEVIATIONS GROUNDED ON
CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Some offenses reflect the clash of cultural norms. They are justified by adult offenders in the name of religious conviction or of a secular code (national, ethnic, class). Now cultural diversity is itself a positive value in a free society. Hence human ingenuity and variety are favored up to the point where the effects are destructive. In a free polity primary norms are supposed to be formulated in a democratic process of discussion and consent. Once the norm has been agreed to, everybody is expected to live up to it. But it is an open secret that prescriptions are not always applied and that any attempt to put some standards of the majority into effect threatens the unity of the body politic. Conceptions of right and wrong are often segregated by region or district, as we well know from the clashes relating to the status of the Negro in American society. What pertinence if any do behavioral studies have to regional contradictions of this kind?

At first sight it might appear that scientists have nothing to offer, since science provides only facts and since civil conflict is a matter of power, resembling the issues that divide nation-states from one another in the arena of world politics. There are, however, ameliorative implications present in the findings of research. Psychiatric medicine, social psychology, and anthropology teach us to search for the roots of all human attitudes. They have shown that these roots often go back to the earliest years of life and that they not untypically depend upon exposure to environments with which the individual was in contact before he had much knowledge of the world. As a result entire generations of young people may grow up in a setting

that incapacitates them from living up to the standards of human dignity. Respect for human dignity can be interpreted to require patience with those who have been systematically inculcated with standards incompatible with that ideal. Behavioral studies provide a factual basis for compassionate attitudes toward human error and prejudice.

We must not lose sight of the fact, however, of what research has to report about the targets of human indignity. It is possible to trace in detail the personality and social deformations that result from continued victimization. We know that wealth often vulgarizes the rich, debases the middle classes, and debauches the poor. Such effects apply with added force to the impact of social castes upon one another. The haughtiness of the upper caste, the servility above and arrogance beneath displayed by the middle castes, the self-abasement of the lower castes—all this is a distortion of self-esteem from the point of view of human dignity. There is an elephantiasis of the ego at one extreme, a pernicious anemia at the other. Psychiatric and social-psychological studies also suggest that assertiveness plays a salutary role in arousing hitherto acquiescent victims to put an end to an abusive environment.

We recognize that men of good will can differ in the inferences they draw from these findings. But I think that the proper interpretation is to emphasize the wisdom of a policy of continuous moral pressure designed to divide the consciences of the deviating minority against itself. Such a strategy keeps the social situation moving toward conformity, yet it avoids the cost of civil war. But social policy is not limited to continuous moral pressure, to the use of persuasion and education. Behavioral research tells us a great deal about the dynamic equilibri-

um of social relations and how to change it economically. Societies possessing a tradition of caste, which therefore reject the worth of the individual, are vulnerable when they come in contact with the industrialism and individualism of western Europe. By this time we have learned a great deal about how to encourage the peaceful transformation of non-industrial regions. The problem, by the way, is not confined to foreign countries. There is undermodernization in the United States; and areas of the kind are strongholds of normative conceptions out of harmony with the overriding ideal of our national life. Programs of economic development are preconditions of the national norms. It is clear that the sanctioning problems relating to cultural diversity receive new definitions in the light of modern economic, social, and political studies.

In international relations the issues that arise in connection with trade, investment, travel, study, and other forms of human contact generate sanctioning problems whose delicacy comes from the fact of diverse cultural norms. During the nineteenth century, when western Europe was riding roughshod over non-industrial peoples, there was a vast arrogance on the part of the spokesmen of Western civilization. I would not want to suggest that more deference to cultural diversity is a result of scientific study alone. Plainly, a more important factor has been the diffusion of modern industrialism among the former colonial peoples and the revolt of these nations against imperial control. But the change in Western arrogance owes something to the knowledge that has been accumulated of alien cultures and to the discovery that folk societies have in some instances done a better job in implementing basic human values than we have. The Pima

and the Papago Indians in the Southwest are one of the most rudimentary cultures known; yet child-rearing appears to proceed with unusual smoothness, partly because of the practice of talking the child to sleep with admonitions and stories. Another tribe of rudimentary material culture has a remarkably spontaneous and joyous set of human relationships. This is evidently bound up with the practice of recalling night dreams early in the morning. Everyone is trained to be alert to any sign of interpersonal tension.

DEVIATION BASED UPON UNCONSCIOUS IMPULSE

I come now to the consideration of a category of offender whose identification owes the most to behavioral studies. The reference is to the deviate who is driven by unconscious demands. We have become familiar with the personality structure of offenders who, on the conscious level, have no desire to impose damage upon themselves or others, yet who are impelled to perform destructive acts on the basis of motivations that are quite obscure to them. One of the earliest categories described in the literature was the so-called "criminal from guilt," a type who acts as though following a plan to provoke punishment from community officials. Two characteristics at least are found in these cases: the offender overlooks items that make detection easy, perhaps leaving a car license at the scene of the crime; and he displays great relief and even exhilaration when he is taken into custody and punished. When such deviates are studied, it is found that the source of the difficulty may be the guilt and tension that spring from attempting to keep hostile impulses in check. (Guilt results from severe disapproval of the "self by the self" in terms of rectitude.)

Among young offenders rebellion against public order often expresses an inner struggle against acute dependency needs. There is the gunman with a baby face, the "pretty boy" type, self-impelled toward desperate measures as a means of heightening a precarious self-esteem. He may have invited ridicule from his agemates for his girlish appearance. He may have been the target of playful or genuine sexual advances which evoked panic against "giving in" and violating an ideal of masculinity. Early jealousies of members of the family circle may figure here. Fears of sexual inadequacy—so often encountered among adolescents—may result in self-contempt against which a defense is the externalization of rage in the form of intimidation, rape, and murder.

Recurring unconscious motivations often involve members of the early family circle, such as a drive to dishonor the parents. The style of an offense may provide clues to the deeper motivation, as when shoplifting is a compulsion that gratifies an unrecognized desire to obtain objects with which to buy affection and overcome the image of an "unlovable" self.

Even laymen now recognize that human beings are not in full control of themselves when they display gross deformations of perception and imagine that they hear whispered voices denouncing them for sinful deeds or believe that they are manipulated by mysterious atomic forces. Such persons are not amenable to the ordinary range of rewards and penalties by which conduct is regulated in a given culture. Individuals in this condition are not "educable" by trial and error based on calculated expediences or reflective loyalty to normative codes. They are "reconstruction" problems, requiring reconstruction be-

fore standard community patterns can affect them.

By recognizing the role of unconscious elements in a deviational act, we enlarge the category of acts brought within the traditional scope of community sanction. We are beginning to see that "accident-prone" motorists do not offend because of calculated risk; rather, they are driven by destructive motivation. They need to be reconstructed in the same way that compulsively driven pyromaniacs require reorientation before they can become responsive members of the community.

At any given moment the community may, of course, have no method at hand capable of reconstructing a given offender. Hence it is necessary to resort to the primitive method of isolating an individual from full participation in community life. The offender thus becomes an "exclusion" problem.

DEVIATION BASED ON IMMATURITY

Young people may be conscious of community norms even as they violate them. Today we are ready to accept the immature as a category requiring special consideration, since we have slowly acquired an understanding of the difficulties of "coming of age" in an era of transition. Behavioral research has convincingly shown how unselective sanctions turn young offenders into hardened deviates, especially when they are put in close association with adult delinquents. We are shocked to think of children and young people in custody alongside alcoholics, drug addicts, professional prostitutes of both sexes, experienced pickpockets, burglars, thieves, and murderers. Sensitivity of this kind, it may be recalled, is a rather recent historic achievement. And factual studies have had some part in amending the earlier

view that the making of fine distinctions among "criminals" is itself "wrong."

Research on juvenile delinquency has made us aware of the gap between delinquent acts that are in harmony with the norm of a small group and solitary acts. In many localities what is called "delinquency" is a group norm of the younger generation. It was easy to recognize the normative character of delinquency when gangs made up of second-generation youngsters were in active rebellion against immigrant parents. Today it is apparent that the conflict between generations is not confined to poverty-stricken neighborhoods inhabited by immigrant families. We are particularly conscious that well-to-do suburban towns are often arenas of conflict. As we become better acquainted with the phenomena, the "gang" deviate appears, if anything, less ultimately disturbing to public order than the "solo" deviate. When young people share a group norm, they are in training for future as well as current co-operation. The task of adults in the community is to provide environmental circumstances in which the energies of youth find other than destructive expression. By this time experiments at "Boys Town" or "Back of the Yards" provide enough knowledge to document the responsiveness of young people to favorable opportunities. Incidentally, a by-product of studying the juvenile offender has been to direct attention to the peculiar problems of the hyperconformist.

DEVIATIONS RESULTING FROM IGNORANCE

The fact of ignorance presents the protector of primary norms with a relatively simple problem. I am referring to the offender who is able and willing to comply with norms when he is told what they are. The cases we have in mind are those

of the immigrant or the traveler from abroad, or the new arrival from isolated districts inside the nation. Picking up an immigrant who can barely understand English and detaining him among seasoned offenders is repugnant to any believer in fair play. The situation is compounded when the victim is denied competent counsel, the aid of an interpreter, or compulsory process for the obtaining of witnesses, and when, as a result, he is incarcerated among persons who are hostile to the norms of their own culture.

The same point applies to the "isolate," the person reared in rural surroundings out of reach of the school system and the sophisticating effect of mass media. When brought to an urban center, the isolate is not much better off than the immigrant from abroad. Studies of the administration of justice have produced information enabling legislators and administrators to provide more appropriate treatment for deviates of this kind.

DEVIATIONS CONDITIONED BY ORGANIC DEFECT

Compassionate human beings have traditionally taken a merciful attitude toward the feeble-minded or sufferers from permanent or transitory organic insufficiency. Today we know a great deal about forms of defect, and we have at our disposal a number of objective tests enabling us to identify cases of true defect (rather than lack of opportunity or perverse development). New therapies have often accomplished sensational results. Even the permanently handicapped, it has been demonstrated, can live useful and happy lives in simplified environments.

THE PROVOCATIVE SITUATION

We have been discussing ways of categorizing the persons who perform an

offending act and the significance of these distinctions for the choice of sanctioning norms. But the sanctioning problem is broader than the consideration of individuals who ultimately breach the public order. It appears that the volume of deviational activity as a whole can be reduced if the number of provocative situations is cut back. A provocative situation is one in which the temptation to break a primary norm is relatively great. When the salary schedule of clerks who handle large sums of money is low, the temptation to steal or to embezzle is presumably greater than when sums are broken into smaller units and the salary scale is good. Some sanctioning norms may be developed in order to reduce practices that "breed crime." The fact is that such adjustments occur spontaneously in many cases in the community. We mentioned embezzlement, which is less severely dealt with than formerly. Presumably the result is to increase the cost of permitting provocative conditions to endure. Hence employers will have an incentive to re-examine administrative procedures with a view to suitable changes.

Sanctioning norms, however, can be expressly aimed at inaugurating change. Houses that have become unsafe, or city lots containing mosquito-breeding pools, may be torn down or drained by community action. When vacant lots have billboards that endanger lives by obstructing the view, public officials may be empowered to correct the situation directly.

THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE AND THE DEMAND TO BE PUNITIVE

Our sanctioning norms are influenced by the amount of damage done and the possibility of restitution, deterrence, and reconstruction. It is frequently claimed on theological and metaphysical grounds

that society has a right to impose suffering as an end in itself. In the history of civilization we are well acquainted with contentions of this kind. They crop up as protests against alleviating the pain of childbirth or surgery or of inoperable cancer. Strictly, it is not for the scientist to ask how it is knowable that the Universal Plan fails to provide for the use of human capabilities for the discovery of the conditions of pain and methods of control. As we said before, if divine will is alleged to require that a wife burn on the pyre of her deceased spouse, the behavioral specialist in his technical role does not set himself up as a theologian and argue in terms of theological doctrine. He is restricted to such issues of fact as the consequences of the rite for the survivors, especially the children. And the facts have no necessary relevance to the transempirical doctrine which may postulate a cosmic order whose attitude toward human happiness or suffering is punitive or indifferent.

A scientist can at least ask for specification. If A alleges a "right" to punish, how much suffering does A call for? Is whipping included? Branding? Cutting off the nose? An arm or leg? Death by torture? In some instances the legislators of the community will be influenced by noticing that opinion is not unanimous; they may come to the view that transempirical intentions on such matters are insuperably difficult to ascertain.

The demand to inflict suffering as an end in itself rests in part upon the image of an actor as the source of his acts. The spread of a scientific viewpoint modifies this image. It appears that an act has its source in an interaction. The part of an interaction that is called "B striking C" typically has part of its source in C, since C may have struck B or imposed some other value deprivation on him, such as

damaging his self-respect, perhaps with an insulting epithet. In such a context there is no point in imposing suffering on B for responding to a great provocation. Suppose, though, that B had a grudge against C before they met. B therefore came into the situation having a predisposition to impose a deprivation upon C. Inquiry may show, of course, that C had previously imposed a provocation on B, so that the stretching-out of the sequence of interaction introduces no new element.

However, our man B may never have laid eyes on C before. B might be suffering from severe organic defects of the kind that precipitate a panic seizure in which human beings are falsely perceived as threatening monsters. B is not the source of the act if we mean that he had it within his organic capability to respond differently. Our previous analysis called attention to certain other categories of responders who are similarly lacking in capability. We spoke of the ignorant, the culturally diverse, and the unconsciously motivated. The imposition of suffering appears to be superfluous in all these cases.

But in two cases, at least, suffering may be an instrument of education. It may deter the offender who has taken a calculated risk, and it may assist in the acculturation of the immature. As an educational method suffering is open to study in reference to definite criteria of appraisal. Hence it can be kept out of the arbitrary, free-wheeling category of an alleged end in itself. The scientific image of an act as an interaction has reduced the demand to impose suffering insofar as this demand depends upon the expectation that people have the capability of abstaining from an act regarded as offensive. Our assumptions about the scope of conscious self-direction have been narrowed; hence the context that is

perceived as pertinent for purposes of explanation or control has therefore been altered. The demand to impose suffering—like the demand to kill—begins to appear as an impulse to be directed to other goals rather than humored or honored by elevation to the status of a terminal goal.

The demand to be punitive can itself be taken as an object of scientific investigation. The late Professor Svend Ranulf conducted a number of studies that established a connection between the rise of middle classes and more reliance upon criminal penalties. He spoke of this as the “disinterested” demand for punishment. Professor Ranulf drew attention to the remarkable rise of penal legislation in ancient Athens when the urban middle classes were becoming more numerous, articulate, and assertive. Puritan England displayed the same phenomenon. “Crimes” multiplied; sanctions became more severe. Findings of this kind do not provide a transempirical basis for accepting or rejecting A’s theology or metaphysics. However, the act of affirming a doctrine does not exist in isolation from the sociohistorical process; and in the past we have seen views of this kind questioned or even modified. More people begin to ask why the middle classes are more justified than other classes in committing themselves in favor of the imposition of suffering.

Behavioral studies tend to establish a link between personality systems and the demand for severity. This came out distinctly in the famous study of the *Authoritarian Personality*. The demand for severity was favored by relatively rigid personalities predisposed to use obsessional or compulsive mechanisms as a means of keeping their destructive urges under control. Findings of this kind, like the results of research on social class, do not oppose one normative doc-

trine with another one. They do raise a question concerning the justification "by personality type" of the demand for suffering.

Administrators of sanctions take public indignation into account and the likelihood that so-called "leniency" will provoke public disorder. If the assertion is that public order will be endangered by failure to be severe, the hypothesis can be studied. The issue is separable from deterrence, which is concerned with diminishing the probability that offenses of a given category will occur. It is, of course, sometimes contended that "public indignation" is a guide to the appropriate severity of sanction. Inquiries tend to show that "crowd excitement" has usually brought about official action whose results are incompatible with enduring community goals. The implication is that the administration of justice in "hot blood" is to be guarded against.

FAMILY DISCIPLINE

We have been examining some of the sanctioning problems that directly concern the entire community. Many of us never face these collective issues very seriously. But most of us have a great deal of experience as targets and applicers of sanctions in the intimate circle of the family. Within the last few decades the behavioral disciplines have brought an enormous body of knowledge of child development into being. It cannot fail to have a bearing on the nature of the sanctions applied by serious-minded parents in the home.

I think most observers will register astonishment at the rapidity with which child-rearing norms in the United States have been affected by various interpretations of the results of research. In 1900 if historians or comparative students of culture had been forecasting the next few

decades of child care, I think most of them would have taken it for granted that the norms of the family would be exceedingly resistant to change. After all, there are always grandmothers, and mothers-in-law, who are by tradition willing, able, and determined to impress the quick with the dead. Today we recognize that a revolutionary modern innovation is the eclipse of grandmothers and mothers-in-law. Traditions that extend many centuries into the past have been liquidated within the memory of many of us who are yet alive to tell the tale. We understand, much better than before, the circumstances in which abrupt breaks in social continuity can occur. It is evident, of course, that the high mobility of American life is a major factor and that mobility means not only the movement from farm and town to city, and from city to city, but that mobility includes changes in class position, especially the rise of ambitious young people from humble origins. To mobility other ingredients have, however, been added.

To a remarkable extent the history of America is bound up with the migration of European peasants. And successive generations of peasant parents have found themselves much slower at meeting the challenges of the new environment than their children. The children, in turn, have been molded by the American school environment, which is one of the greatest instruments of acculturation known to history. The teachers have been influenced by the standards set in the centers of higher education and investigation. In these new, rapidly expanding, and highly subdivided institutions the scientific outlook provides the criteria of impersonality needed as a check to clashing systems of belief and to the tension of ambitious personalities interacting with one another. Children ex-

posed to clashing religious, ethnic, and regional conceptions often find in the pursuit of scientific inquiry the avenue to an orderly and disciplined mode of life that appears to transcend the warring norms. In this world of exuberant specialization and observation man and culture are made objects of investigation with a vigor unsurpassed elsewhere. The principal theories and innovations of method originated in the older centers of European civilization. In the United States, however, these ideas and methods have been applied and adapted on a grand scale, producing a Niagara of piecemeal findings and provocative hypotheses.

In a child-centered culture every parent wants to do the best for his child, and the best is often the most recent. With traditional and customary patterns of living in flux, the one sure thing seems to be the insufficiency of the old and the likelihood that some new practice will prove to be better than the old. This has created a remarkable openness to the latest findings of pediatrics or child study—an openness, I repeat, not readily paralleled anywhere else in history.

Given intense motivations to renovate the modes of child-rearing coupled with an opportunity to seize new ideas connected in some way with science, Americans have lived through a formidable period of transition. It is safe to say that this fabulous and partly fantastic period is over. It is over because the more extreme interpretations are falling into place, which is often, though not necessarily, the trash bin. It is over because a relatively stable frame of reference has been emerging—a frame that sets more sophisticated limits upon enthusiasm and style in these matters.

It is possible to review the more eccentric manifestations of the period of

transition with mixed sentiments of horror and amusement. (In this area we are exceptionally well fortified with excellent observations made by Martha Wolfenstein.) The horror arises from the spectacle of the damage that must have been done to defenseless infants and children by the vagaries of psychological and medical opinion. We can caricature the older code of discipline by saying that nothing the infant wanted to do spontaneously was good for him (except sleep). And the answering caricature was that nothing the infant or child wanted to do (short of murder, suicide, or mayhem) was bad for him. It is most unlikely, of course, that child-rearing practices were as flexible as the second caricature suggests, since the most susceptible families were upper middle-class professional ones where the wives enjoyed the advantages of a liberal arts college education, at least, and kept active after college in serious clubs and associations.

I am suggesting that the net impact of research on child development is to support the use of positive or negative sanctioning norms in the home which are less indulgent than those recently fashionable though less deprivational than the earlier tradition is alleged to have authorized. But I am most interested in emphasizing an inference to be drawn from the interplay of norm and fact in the difficult yet crucial field of child development. The inference is that a better job of communication and education needs to be done in schools and in adult life if we are to avoid the danger of claims exaggerated in the name of science. Scientific societies are not unaware of their responsibilities; nor are the publications that give currency to scientific work as uncritical today as they were. Properly conceived, the scientific approach calls for a critical attitude about “going off the deep end.”

But one difficulty is that normative and other interests join in exploiting factual results that seem to corroborate their claims. Today, for example, we are witnessing a sudden rise of interest in the results of research on child development which are construed by "disciplinarians" as furnishing ammunition for a counter-offensive against "progressive education."

So far as sanctioning norms are concerned, then, we can say that behavioral studies have increased the selectivity with which sanctioning policies are applied. In some fields, notably in family affairs, special circumstances led at first to the use of scientific studies in ways that exaggerated the normative confusions then prevailing. Recently the growth of a more critical frame of reference has cut down premature efforts to apply highly provisional and piecemeal findings to the intricate problems of child development.

On the whole, there is ground for saying that the behavioral sciences have pushed the sanctioning norms in the same direction as the primary norms, namely, toward more discriminating attention to human dignity. But I want to take note of an offsetting effect of the behavioral sciences during the last generation—an effect to which I have given no more than incidental notice so far. The most revolutionary scientific ideals and methods that have influenced the growth of the behavioral sciences have come from psychotherapy. An enormous literature has come into being that deals with disorders of every kind. The emphasis is upon neurotic symptoms, psychotic disturbances, and character deformations. Attention has been called to whatever features of infancy, childhood, and youth may indicate the current presence of a problem or signalize the approach of later difficulties.

Whatever is different is suspected of being a causal factor in the occurrence of pathology. Though a rational way to proceed in choosing hypotheses for investigation, this approach has some grave repercussions. All individuality becomes suspect. Parents come to fear originality in their children. No parent wants a sick child or a monster. Responsible parents do not want to take serious risks with their sons and daughters. So they play safe. If Mary is a tomboy, she is trotted off to someone who can fit her with psychic skirts. If Bobby plays with dolls a little longer than the brat up the street, there's the deuce to pay. Pop and Mom didn't raise their boy to be a sissy.

Pop and Mom aren't too sure of themselves anyhow, since they are in the midst of transition toward a new civilization. The older conceptions of masculine and feminine roles are changing. The new technology abolishes most of the traditional distinctions between a man's job and a woman's job; modern machinery is opposed to ruffles, skirts, and fussy hairdos. Modern sports require slacks and shorts, handy caps and token hats. As girls grow more like boys at work and play, they are tempted to be more like them in sex habits. None of this is easy for the girls or the boys. Once upon a time we had a sex-typed culture. Today the sexes are moving in opposite directions and producing multiple types where personal taste is the rule. But the tensions of transition are fearful. They make for caution, timidity, and surface conformity in child-rearing.

The motto has been "adjustment." The personality is supposed to be "well rounded." Above all, no "squares." Parents are often genuinely upset when they have an exceptionally bright child, especially if the child is a girl. And a withdrawn and studious child may be a bit of a scandal. Many parents are afraid to in-

sist on long hours of hard intellectual work at home. There is reluctance to insist upon religious or some other minority cultural practice (like music or painting) for fear the child will be set apart from his schoolmates and exposed to ridicule and misunderstanding. The idea that people grow by solving problems, not by avoiding them, is out of harmony with what is often construed to be the sweet jazz of "adjustment." The primary norms accepted by the timid elder generation are dictated by the social imperative of "keeping up with the Joneses." And the sanctioning norms are no more or less permissive than the standards the Joneses are assumed to be imposing upon the little Joneses. And of course the Joneses are busy making the same calculations about the Smiths. It is this characteristic of American life that has been so neatly summed up in David Riesman's conception of "other-directedness," which is itself a dexterous bit of social psychiatry.

It cannot be successfully held that parents and teachers have received much help during this trying period from physicians or psychologists. The fundamental ideas of the specialists are part of the flux of this epoch of transition. Let us take one fundamental example: the idea of health and disease. It is fluctuating, contradictory, vague. We are acquainted with the facetious definition that health is what is left when the symptoms are subtracted. But what are the criteria of symptoms? Obviously, every deviation from the statistical mode of an age group or a social class cannot be regarded as a symptom, since deviations may be toward excellence.

The medical tradition fails to provide a fundamental answer because it has been absorbed with organic relationships. In deciding whether a given detail

is to be classified as a symptom, medical men have limited themselves to the skin boundary of the body. But this is no help in classifying the neuroses, the psychopathic characteristics, or even some of the psychotic disorders. Modern psychopathology puts medicine in a quandary because it keeps trying to diagnose and treat troubles whose existence official medicine does not have the conceptual tools to recognize. Gradually it has been dawning upon those concerned that the tissue bundle is not the most significant frame of reference for the classification of phenomena as healthy or diseased. Rather, the frame of reference is behavioral. It is social. It is the pattern of interaction among people. The disease process (the pathic process) includes not only the night terrors of the child but the parent who intimidates it. In the case of many sufferers from gastrointestinal difficulties more is disordered than the tract itself. The pathic process includes the domineering partner who provokes the inner turmoil that may find expression in the tissue break.

The inference is that there is no comprehensive conception of health or disease apart from an explicit system of social norms. Functional disorders ("psychosomatic" or "socosomatic" disorders) are to be understood largely as unconscious sanctions resulting from conflicts among norms—conflicts that the persons involved have been unable to resolve. When this is more widely understood, the behavioral sciences will have made a fundamental contribution to the understanding of norms in society. Such "sanctions equivalents" as the "psychosomatic (socosomatic) disorders" will give place to direct scrutiny of conflicts among primary norms and to the means of transmuting these seemingly incompatible patterns into an integrated whole consonant with the goal of human digni-

ty. The appropriate norms for sanctioning purposes will then be greatly clarified in the total process. There is nothing simple, of course, about the discovery of the relationships to which we are referring or the solutions most appropriate to the problems at stake.

We cannot look to the behavioral scientists in their professional capacity to shoulder our individual responsibility for deciding what manner of individuality to seek in ourselves or to permit in our children, or in others whom we influence. But the growth of knowledge will expose the total consequences of conformity as well as of originality or deviation. The crude initial studies of the costs of difference will be supplemented—as indeed they are being supplemented—by studies

of the costs of stereotyping and conformity. Already there are indications of the latent problems that arise when talents and propensities are suppressed or repressed out of deference to the steamroller of conformity. These are the issues that rise to plague and embitter the later years of life with a sense of estrangement from experience and a haunting sense of chagrin and guilt for a lifetime of timidity and cowardice.

We are engaged in a vast reconstruction of our cultural inheritance in the light of the behavioral sciences. Our conclusion is that the impact upon primary and sanctioning norms has been to bring the practices of our civilization into somewhat closer harmony with the basic ideals of human dignity.

III. PROCEDURES OF INSIGHT AND ENLIGHTENMENT

I HAVE been emphasizing the effect of the behavioral sciences upon the specific content of norms. In the long run, however, my expectation is that "procedures" will be more drastically modified than "formulations." It is a matter of the methods by which the probability can be increased that a normative principle will be applied free of distortion. What rules of orderly procedure will improve the likelihood of undistorted individual and group applications?

By this time the behavioral sciences have amply documented the point that unconscious factors, for instance, are capable of defeating conscious purposes. All normative systems are open to challenge at the conscious level. It is entirely appropriate on intellectual grounds to probe and appraise the logical coherence, symmetry, or economy of expression employed in systems of doctrine whether sacred or secular. From a formal standpoint every system begins with postulates and undefined terms. Hence it is always possible to question the choice of a particular starting point. The healthy uncertainties that are inseparable from the act of thought can be complicated by the undertow of doubts that take their origin in the recurring anxieties bred of unconscious tension within the personality system. The history of theological, ethical, political, or legal doctrine characteristically describes the growth of deviation from the inspiration or the intent of the originators of the doctrine. Behavioral studies throw some light on the process by showing how obsessional thinking leads to the elaboration of logical systems in ways that subvert the

overriding goals of the system as a whole. It is appropriate to ask, therefore, whether methods of self-discipline are available by means of which the unconscious factors can be brought under the control of the psyche as a whole.

I take as an instance the case of a student who became fascinated in his capacity as a student of political philosophy and as a conscious adherent of democratic values with Kant's rule about the consideration of every man as an end rather than as a means. What is meant by the rule? The rule, began the student, concerns man. Obviously, it does not apply to children, since they are not mature. But what are the marks of maturity? Surely it is not a matter of simple chronology in view of the failure of many individuals to attain physical maturity at any time. Surely it is not alone a physiological matter, since some physically sound specimens are murderously antisocial. Evidently the test of maturity is character. And what is maturity of character? It is devotion to ideal norms of conduct. But such devotion is exhibited by few. Only a few members of any generation, therefore, are entitled to be treated as ends, not means. Properly understood, then, the Kantian rule is a rule of supermen. It favors a "democracy of supermen." In principle the opportunity is always available to everyone to become a man. These points were developed by the student under no little tension, since he was convinced that a great truth was about to dawn. The truth, he thought, was the fallibility of traditional democratic doctrine and the substitution therefor of a "purified" conception.

It happened that the student was re-

ceiving some psychiatric help at the time and presently became aware of the fact that he had transformed democratic doctrine into its opposite without having set out to do so or, for that matter, without awareness of the outcome. He obtained insight into the transformation and also into at least some of the factors within himself that moved him in this direction.

The unconscious transformation of a proposition into its opposite is a regular hazard of the intellectual life and indicates why it is important to emphasize the use of procedures capable of warning individuals and groups against distortions that come from unconscious influences. In traditional ethics and logic too much stress has been put upon rules for the formulation of content; that is, rules for the arranging of statements according to consistency, generality, or economy of expression. The behavioral sciences enable us to see that a mind is suitable for the achievement of a contextually relevant ethics and logic only when it is disciplined by exposure to the appropriate procedures. For the relevant use of the mind, principles of procedure as well as of formulation of content are required. This is part at least of what John Dewey appears to have been urging in his logic of inquiry. I think of it as a strategy of choice, of decision, in which the problem may be to formulate a primary or sanctioning norm, to generalize a descriptive proposition, or to arrive at particular applications.

My position is that methods have been devised by behavioral scientists as a by-product of their descriptive purposes that are also of basic importance for normative purposes. I shall discuss some of these methods briefly in this section. The references will be to the free association of ideas in a social context, the recording of social interactions, the

taking of statistical surveys of opinion, the use of equivalencies in the carrying-on of communication, and the employment of methods of continuing consultation.

The procedures for describing human interaction that have been invented by behavioral scientists carry no mean temptation to those who uphold norms. The temptation is to use the new instruments to improve the administration of standards in concrete circumstances. In many situations, however, it seems that this is incompatible with traditional norms which support certain zones of privacy. Later we shall deal to some extent with this issue, chiefly for the purpose of emphasizing the urgent need of continuing efforts to cope with it.

Finally, we shall look in at least cursory fashion at the future of relationships between behavioral sciences and normative standards and procedures. Can we plan more directly to realize the potential of the policy sciences for freedom?

We turn first to the available stock of procedures.

THE METHOD OF FREE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS (IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT)

The behavioral scientist, we have said, is accustomed to ask for the specification of terms of ambiguous reference. Without adopting such a procedure, he is unable to apply his peculiar skill. Specification, however, is not the most unique method devised by behavioral scientists that has procedural significance for normative thinkers. In fact, the principal discovery in the study of behavior seems at first glance to run in the opposite direction. It does not require the thinker to move in an orderly manner from one definition to the next, or from one summary of data to the next. I am referring to the "free association" of ideas. When

associations are called "free," an attitude of permissiveness is meant. The technique is to encourage every fantasy and mood to flit across the mind without undergoing the censorship of a grammarian or a stylist or an ethicist. The technique is a method of self-discovery. It requires that literally everything that comes into the mind be caught hold of and used in observation of the self.

It is not clear to me how many people are accustomed to think of "free association" as an instrument of everyday usefulness. A few years ago it was common to assume that this device was walled up in the clinic and more particularly that it was connected only with the psychoanalyst's couch. In the meantime there has been some permeation of the idea that the technique of free fantasy (or free association) is a novel addition to the equipment of a healthy mind. It is not to be confounded with the ether, the formaldehyde, or the detergents used in hospital practice. Free association is a means of curing one of the principal over-emphases to which the mind of man is subject in the march from the maternity ward through the nursery school to the university. A youngster is supposed to learn how to concentrate upon the problem in hand. Recitations and examinations are supposed to encourage the arts of logical, or even persuasive, thought and speech. The bubbling core of the inner life is gradually fenced in so that, if it gushes at all, it gushes decorously—like Old Faithful surrounded by a standard crowd of tourists.

Creative writers and artists, at least, have always been addicted to some variant of the technique of free association. They are accustomed to give a long rope to the play of inner fantasy and to go for long periods without jerking it up tight. With the aid of modern psychologists

such as Ernst Kris we have learned to recognize the remarkable tension sustained by a creative artist. The artist must allow himself to regress. He must give latitude to unconscious urges without giving way to them. On a lesser scale it is practicable for everyone to obtain a degree of self-control enabling him to keep on creative terms with his less than fully conscious processes.

What we have in mind differs from the absorbed receptivity of the painter or the poet. We speak only of a process of gaining access to features of the self pertinent to the formulation and exercise of normative judgment. The technique of free association can be used to equip the self to live in closer harmony with ideals of conduct. Even people of good will are beset by the obsessions and compulsions, the unresolved residues of developmental difficulties. The role of free association is to aid in liberating the self from these largely unconscious legacies.

The general view has been that it is impracticable for anyone to master the art of free fantasy without working under the tutelage of a psychiatrist. By himself an individual may go round in endless circles without gaining insight into his latent preoccupation. It is the business of the psychoanalyst who is conducting either a therapeutic or a training analysis to provide the interpretative assistance that enables the individual to escape from his private whirlpool of random communication. The late Karen Horney took the position that individuals who have received some training in an interview situation can sometimes proceed alone. During the years all kinds of expedients have been tried by busy therapists to expedite their work. Subjects have been asked to write out their associations and to bring them in for review and for association in the face-to-face

situation. Methods of projective testing and of undirected interviewing have sometimes moved toward stimulating a free flow of fantasy. And it is true that former patients or trainees have come to understand the topography of their personality systems and that they have sometimes continued to use free-association devices in order to bring into the full focus of attention the preoccupations that cling to the margins of consciousness.

Our normative ideal is to live up to the ideal of human dignity. By adopting the procedure of free association, we have at our disposal a means of discovering our relationship to specific norms. In many instances we find that our conscious devotion is not matched by deep determination to live up to them. By probing into sources of resistance, we may recognize the attitudes that have exercised an unauthorized sway over our conduct.

It is to be understood that I am not referring to any ritualized castigation of the self for errors or sins of omission or commission. Rather, I am speaking of a disciplined quest for insight and understanding conducted by one of the most subtle and potent instruments at the disposal of the human mind. Its role is not to take the place of rite and ritual but rather to add to the means of self-improvement open to us.

The method of free association can be employed in such a manner that we come to terms with our own biography and with the social situations in which we have lived in the past and in which we live each day. We are enabled to review the whole system of normative standards with which we are identified and to explore their roots. Our career line from birth has unfolded in a sequence of interaction with a widening human context. Unless we have achieved perspective on

this inner and outer sequence, we have lived an unexamined life; and our normative generalizations and applications lack grounding in experience.

In Section I, I described the social process as an interaction in which values are shaped and shared according to various perspectives and operations which are combined in practices and institutions whose regularities constitute "personality" and "culture." Using the United Nations Declaration, I called attention to a preliminary specification of a social process in which human dignity rather than indignity is the goal. In such a dynamic equilibrium human relations are carried on in a manner that achieves a high degree of participation in all the social values throughout a given community. The norms of society relate to each major value and to the institutions, organized and unorganized, by which the values are shaped and shared. There are norms pertaining to the power value, the institutions of government and politics; wealth, or economic institutions; respect, or social class; well-being, or health and safety; skill, or institutions of taste; affection, or family, friends, and culture; enlightenment, or information and estimates of the future; and rectitude, or the inclusive standards of moral and religious responsibility.

By combining a map of the social process with the exercise of free association (and interpretation), it becomes possible for the judge, or the lawyer, or any serious-minded person to adopt a procedure that increases the probability that he will effectively apply normative criteria in concrete circumstances.

Let us consider some examples of what is disclosed by the use of free association as a means of exploring the individual's relationship to the norms of society. Consider social class or the distribution

of respect in the community. The research conducted by Lloyd Warner and his associates has created a new understanding in this country of how communities are divided into more or less stable class strata. You recall how six categories of class were distinctly recognized by the inhabitants of an old New England town: "upper upper," "middle upper," "upper middle," "lower middle," "upper lower," and "lower lower." In a newer community in the Middle West there was no "upper upper" tier of "old families." Other places lacked one or more of the remaining class strata. Warner showed that the class structure has a channeling effect upon all values of the kind we have been talking about (such as skill or enlightenment) and that other values tend to support the class structure itself. It is a very rewarding experience to examine one's past for the purpose of spelling out in detail the effect of past exposure to upper- or middle- or lower-class environments. Persons of middle-class origin in the United States, at least, are rather astonished to see how full of jealousy, suspicion, hatred, and related manifestations they are when they engage in a serious self-study. This appears to come from the stringent demands for achievement that are loaded upon the youngster by his ambitious parents. In order to live up to these norms, the child experiences a great deal of tension, which comes from the disciplining of wayward impulses. The use of free association frequently holds a mirror to the self and may show the presence of great hostility toward others (and ultimately toward the self). Censoriousness may sound as though high standards of rectitude were at stake. And, indeed, this often is the fact. But deeper probing may show that power orientations are more basic. The individual may be im-

pelled by an intense desire to impose himself on others; or, failing this, to identify with a power figure by becoming a devoted slave.

The results of self-scrutiny need not be sensational in order to influence conduct. In a judge's self-study the comparatively simple discovery was made that he thought nearly everybody was a liar. Actually, he realized for the first time how many dubious theories of popular anthropology entered into his estimates of prospective law clerks or of lawyers. It turned out that he believed that people with big ears were criminals; and so, for that matter, were people with small ears. He had his doubts about anybody whose hair was black, red, or white; and he was not too sure about blonds. As for shape of head, the judge believed in the five-star face—that is, the broad, square visage surmounting a prominent jaw. He ultimately became convinced that in innumerable instances he had done grave injustice to parties appearing before his court who had the misfortune to fit the wrong physical image. In the future, at least, he felt more competent to live up to the norms of impartiality.

Almost everyone seems to take seemingly non-rational prejudices against particular persons and, on the other hand, to take non-rational fancies. The latter is called love and is generally regarded with varying degrees of toleration and approval. But much mischief is done by subterranean love, by attractions below the surface of consciousness that expose themselves as something else. This is a sphere in which methods of free association cannot infrequently lay bare the truth and divest it of menace by subjecting the impulse to insight. A review of the history of the self as one who gives or receives affection is itself a rewarding exercise. For it sometimes dis-

closes a picture very different from the conscious image of the "favorite son" or the "ugly duckling."

Intellectual arrogance takes many forms which may be unmasked by careful observation of the intimate life. During the war a brilliant young officer did extremely well in an intelligence agency where he was relied upon to form a picture of enemy intentions. The stress of his responsibilities was so great that he obtained some psychological assistance. Without destroying a good intelligence officer, the process helped to create a more trustworthy character. At first the officer was only dimly aware of his extreme competitiveness in every intellectual field. He was terrified at the prospect of having to accept an interpretation made by somebody else. The result was that he was exceedingly unfair to able officers who tried to offer ideas. He might appear to appreciate suggestions, but, in fact, he resented them and often arranged for the transfer of bright young men. And he was ungenerous in distributing praise. Eventually he discovered within himself a recurring image of a very naked little boy being ridiculed by other children and disentangled from his past a series of formative experiences in which the brilliant intellectual fireworks covered up the recurring fear of being laughed at. On such seemingly trivial things does the equilibrium of the self depend; and, if the self is to become better prepared for ideal achievement, these are precisely the details that require insight and understanding.

RECORDING SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

The procedure of free association is borrowed from the clinic for purposes of self-study. But a number of tools have been developed by social psychologists (and others) in connection with their

own research. Some of these devices are adapted to the needs of the conscientious person who is trying to live up to his normative ideals. A simple and useful method of self-observation is the logbook. The mechanics are subject to endless modification to fit the exigencies of life in the office or elsewhere. All that is needed is a means of recording the persons to whom one speaks in the office, or converses with over the telephone, or greets on the street, and so on through the ordinary interactions of daily life.

Let me describe how the president of a certain college used this device. As a former teacher the president belonged to that amiable company of college presidents determined not to lose touch with students. When I met him, he was telling us how fine his relations were to the campus. We challenged some of his statements, and he eventually volunteered to try to carry a logbook. He made it as simple as possible. His equipment consisted of a packet of blank cards. He filled one out each day. Because the president was interested in his relations to the student body, he decided to put down an "S" every time he talked to a student. Deans are obviously so weighty that they required a separate category, "D," as did other administrative personnel ("A"). And there were professors who were not deans ("P"). There were alumni ("Al"), members of boards of trustees ("T"), big figures in the community ("C"), and so on. The president compiled quite a list of categories before he began recording. After a month he got curious about the results and asked his secretary to add up the figures. He was horrified to discover that in a month he had talked to no student, save on disciplinary matters, and rarely to any faculty member ranking below a four-star general (that is, dean or department

chairman). Obviously, the president had a fantasy-image of the self that required correction. And the logbook procedure was capable of contributing data to the reassessment.

The logbook can be used for scientific purposes in the study of administration. It can also be employed to improve the efficiency of an operation. For instance, it may be used to improve the "public relations" of a college by making sure that the chief executives get around to meet the "right people." But this is not the present point. I am interested in calling attention to the fact that tools have been developed which are convertible to the needs of the individual who has a concern for discovering and reducing the spread between his professions and his practices. The college president of whom I spoke was not primarily interested in his public relations. His conception of the obligation of his office was high and included firsthand association with the young people under his charge. After recovering from the first shock, he set about reorganizing his activities to make student contacts more frequent.

Perhaps I should remark in passing that the behavioral sciences have devised a great many instruments for describing the traits and trait-clusters of a personality system. These tests have usually been planned to serve medical purposes or to enable young people to discover latent talent capable of being matured into socially useful skill. These instruments have also been utilized in the armed forces and in industry to select and assign men. Without in any way belittling these purposes, I am saying that tests are important as instruments of ethical improvement.

Now there is something repugnant to many of us about the idea of tests and normative aspiration. It smacks of the

grade school and the strange marks found on report cards under terms like "Depotment." The traumatic occurrences of report-card days have burned a psychic hole in many a life, and the chronically juvenile components of our personalities continue to fight the battles of yesterday. But the responsible life need not be a static life. It does not need to resist instruments of improvement. If it is axiomatic to "know thyself," it is not frivolous to use the best available procedures by which the self can be known.

A DECENT REGARD FOR THE OPINIONS OF OTHERS

The responsible person seeks to give due deference to the views and sentiments of others. It has always been practicable to live up to this standard of conduct in neighborhood matters, since one is usually well informed of local opinion. The wider the circle of interaction, however, the less likely one is to understand the approach of others. With the expansion of modern media of communication and the spread of representative government, general elections, and the referendum, it has become possible to consider the distribution of opinion through large publics. And within the last few years the behavioral sciences have perfected the statistical opinion survey as a means of describing public expectations and preferences. As a result it is possible to adhere more closely to the ideal of having a decent regard for the opinions of one's fellow men. A by-product of scientific work has been a procedure capable of being applied to normative problems.

In the free world, institutions specializing in surveys of opinion are extending their coverage. The major nations have regular staffs of interviewers who are interrogating sample panels of citizens rep-

resenting the sex, age, income, regional, partisan, and other characteristics of the population. Although this institutional growth is quite recent, it is increasingly taken for granted. At first, of course, the acceptance of the practice passed through a phase of "nervous resistance" in which all sorts of pseudoscientific objections mingled with expressions of indignation, ridicule, or confusion. Presently, the obvious rationality of the method has survived the splutter, and the opinion survey has disappeared from the cartoons as a topic of current wisecracks.

There are, however, more serious long-range problems of accommodation. Popular interest in forecasting is responsible for the fact that one of the most conspicuous applications of the brief interview technique is in the prediction of elections. Scientific reporters of opinion have always tried to explain that they are reporting present replies to their questions and that all sorts of things may come up between the last interrogation and the final vote. But they might as well save their breath. The initial response of the general public is that the pollsters are soothsayers. So the pollsters are often tempted to look mysterious and hunt up a few chicken livers to carve up in their auguries. But the hocus-pocus is, in fact, kept under discipline by a simple fact: voters do as they please, and they often please to do differently than they said they would do in the surveys. This is greeted with cries of outrage by the "betrayed" and by smirks of satisfaction from the ones who came out on top. (Of all the smirkers, President Harry S. Truman was undoubtedly the most justified; and he would not be the hearty Mr. Truman if he kept his satisfaction to himself.) Less involved bystanders remark that it is a good thing for democracy that voting seems to make a difference, after

all. And the pollsters stand up to the bitter winds with as much grace as they can muster—and overhaul some of their sampling methods if they are wise. But I repeat that the competent surveyors of opinion are under no illusion about their infallibility in predicting the future. Most of them regret the fact that they were not able to convince the general public to accept "probability" estimates instead of flat forecasts that the Republicans (or the Democrats) would win.

It is likely that the members of the public will gradually grow more sophisticated about surveys. They will recapitulate the familiar history of business forecasting, where investors and managers learn to shoulder their own responsibilities for decision rather than to abdicate to a graph of hypothetical future sales or earnings. The experienced attitude is that surveys summarize the past and project future curves of development under various assumptions. It is the obligation of the ultimate decision-maker to select among the assumptions and to stake his neck on the result.

Most of us would agree, I think, that, while we are under an obligation to give due deference to the opinions of others, we are under no obligation to adopt them. One complaint about opinion surveys is that they create "band-wagon effects," because the public at large is disposed to go along with the winner. If this happens, it is indeed deplorable; a valid purpose of civic education is to encourage citizens to think for themselves before they decide to go along with a majority or minority view. There is, by the way, much evidence that on many issues there is no band-wagon effect. On the contrary, the report of successful agitation in favor of a new policy may goad all the conservative forces into full cry on the other side.

There are several means at hand of supporting thoughtful elements in the community in the consideration of controversial issues. One is to report what persons of special competence have to say about it. Surveys are sometimes made of expert opinion, which is then spread broadcast.

Whatever the difficulties may be that arise in connection with the survey of opinion, there is no gainsaying the point that the sample-interview method provides a means of moralizing private and collective judgment. We can find out what people do, in fact, believe.

CLEAR COMMUNICATION

Closely connected with the brief opinion interview are many other instruments of research on communication. Although every friend of freedom favors persuasion rather than coercion, he is frequently compelled to admit that the barriers in the path of communication are too high to surmount. During recent years a more sanguine viewpoint has been slowly spreading among students of comparative culture and the communication process. By proper means of study it is possible to discover the "equivalents of meaning" among persons and groups.

Physicians trained in the germ theory of disease and in other proud discoveries of modern medicine have railed against the ignorance and stupidity of the medicine men and midwives, and the community at large, in nearly every quarter of the globe. Now no physician worthy of his salt would waste time swearing at a micro-organism or at a crippled patient. And it is a curious defect of training that creates a medical corps readier with insults and complaints than with relevant observation and experiment. Modern medicine has been one-sided in its approach, so that many of its practitioners

have not felt at home with human beings or with culture. They have been better equipped to describe temperatures than to ascertain beliefs, faiths, and loyalties. Hence the study of the communication process has been carried on mainly by anthropologists, social psychologists, and the like. These researches have often succeeded in disclosing the equivalencies of experience that provide a bridge between the perspectives of our civilization, with its technical arts, and other cultures.

For instance, there are folk societies whose medical views are remarkably like the humoral theories of the tradition from which the medicine of western Europe took its growth. It is believed that noxious essences may invade vital organs and that they can be withdrawn by heat and drainage. The application of heat by electrical pads or other equipment in the hospital can be made instantly intelligible by interpreting it in the perspective of local belief.

In some folk societies the conception of psychosomatic interrelationships is older and clearer than our own. Hostile attitudes are well understood as possible sources of internal disorder; and it is obvious that therapy must not only assist in undoing the somatic damage but in altering hostile relations.

A powerful means of communication occurs when the fundamental myth of the culture is given serious consideration. These myths are capable of growth in the same way that the traditions of the oldest civilizations have been amenable to the impact of higher conceptions of human dignity evolved elsewhere. The more we learn about men and their cultures, the more variable they appear to be and the fuller of potentially creative contradiction and confusion. Think of the astonishing circumstances attending the arrival of the Spanish in Mexico. The

Spaniards were not attacked and swept into the sea because of an agonizing uncertainty that paralyzed the will of the ruling few and led to their ultimate ruin. The agonizing doubt was whether the Spanish were not emissaries of a returning god; and, by the way, the god who was expected was believed to be content with more moderate sacrifices than the human gore that splashed down the altars of Old Mexico. The spectacle of internal contradiction, of unstable equilibrium, is in principle no exceptional case. Think of the Hawaiian Islands, another situation precariously poised on the brink of internally generated change.

The inference is that behavioral studies give us new confidence in the possibility of the effective meeting of minds, in genuine communication. It is true that coercive barriers may be erected to shut out communications originating from outside, and these barriers may be very strong. My reference is to the possibility of understanding where it can be tried. The methods at our disposal make it possible to proceed through the patient application of the principle of equivalency of experience. The modern devices of communication are of great potential importance in this enterprise (especially the film, which provides a common reference for a word, and thereby links words and meanings).

CONTINUING CONSULTATION

I have been emphasizing the procedures by which we can be informed of the thoughts and feelings of others, whether we are speaking of the region, the nation, or mankind as a whole. I have also referred to instruments of self-observation that enable us to look more intensively at ourselves and hence more understandingly at our fellows. It is obvious that many of our normative prob-

lems must be met in isolation. But in a world of expanding population and complicating texture of life many normative issues need to be met jointly. And I call attention to experiments whose aim is to foster a richer and more significant human experience in group situations.

The reference is to small-group experiments that have been conducted for purposes that range from therapy to administrative problem-solving. The scientific movements include "psychodrama," in which therapy is fostered in expressive activity, "group psychoanalysis," "group counseling," "seminars in semantics," and so on. Outside the scientific fold we note the existence of many small-group movements that have gained extraordinary acceptance, such as Moral Rearmament and Alcoholics Anonymous.

I regard the appearance of such primary group activities as an important feature of our epoch. Persons are attempting rather blindly to cope with the uprooting and depersonalizing tendencies of the technoscientific age. They are trying to identify themselves with a total social process and to escape from isolation by mutually disclosing and appraising experience. Scientific studies record the successes and failures of group combinations and methods of action. One experiment, for example, divides an audience into small groups who then hold discussions among themselves before the general discussion is called to order. If you enter an auditorium where these "buzz sessions" are going on, you get an extraordinary impression of a whispering Niagara.

More conventional modes of conference are capable of formulating and applying norms for the special questions that arise in the institutional settings of modern life. Many kinds of skill and experience are contributory. Men of affairs

can benefit by listening to the professional student of behavior and also to the ethicist and the religionist. Continuing conferences composed of men of good will and of diversified competence can probably get ahead with the common challenge of our age.

DEFINING THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION

The technical potentialities now available in modern civilization confront us with problems of self-limitation in gathering and applying knowledge with a bearing on norms. I refer particularly to the means at our disposal for penetrating the privacy of others. Instruments for recording the voice make it possible to plant microphones in bedrooms and offices, jury rooms and board rooms. Photography can record rapidly moving objects at a distance, and infrared enables us to defy the dark. We can administer drugs and obtain uninhibited stories of the past. And there is hypnosis, strangely neglected in the medicine and psychology of the West, that permits the veil of the past to lift once more. Even the methods of lie detection that depend on involuntary movements, and involuntary changes of skin conductance or blood pressure, can be used to open the secret doors of the personality. The time is rapidly approaching when, in principle, privacy will be no more.

It is unnecessary for me to outline in detail the dangers that attend the threat to privacy. It is not too much to say that the growth of culture and character has been closely connected with rhythms of participation and withdrawal. Privacy has been essential to the discovery of the self and the vision of new ideals and ideas. The "secret places of the heart" are the sanctum of conscience. If we abolish the confrontation of the "self by

the self," we change our conception of individuality and of responsibility.

We know that absolute rulers are enemies of privacy—that is, the privacy of others. They use privacy as a means of enhancing their own prestige, and the denial of privacy as an instrument for attacking the prestige (and self-respect) of others.

Behavioral scientists have laid hold on the instruments devised by modern physical science and engineering and have adapted them to the study of human response. These studies are made piecemeal; and they are typically undertaken with the laudable intention of narrowing the frontiers of ignorance. And many worthy purposes are often served by invasions of privacy, especially in the detection of offenses against the common good.

By this time, however, I think we have accumulated enough experience to recognize that it is wiser to forego some kinds of knowledge, and to bear the resulting cost, than to break down the barriers to privacy under some circumstances. These issues are posed by the insatiable curiosity of science and also by the insatiable demand for detailed information by the upholders of many social norms. We cannot turn for precedents to a past where these problems have been solved. Rather, the challenge is to face the contemporary scene and to agree to new and workable rules of self-limitation. Some of these rules may receive the status of community prescription (statutes). Others can be left to the self-regulation of private individuals and groups.

We are, in fact, working out practical codes of conduct, beginning with the rudimentary requirement that private information shall be protected, hence disclosed voluntarily, if at all, only under special conditions, such as reasonable

suspicion of an unlawful act. I am suggesting that we take codes for the protection of privacy with great seriousness. A "Commission on the Proper Limits of Privacy," appointed by a private agency, could go a long way in bringing clarity into the present confusion.

THE POLICY SCIENCES OF FREEDOM

Throughout this study I have had occasion to refer to the fact that the net impact of the behavioral sciences appears to be in harmony with the ideal norm of our society. I mentioned this in reference to primary norms and pointed especially to the disclosure of the significant function of the "human" values. The selection of sanctioning norms has been affected in much the same way. Instead of dealing with "crime," for instance, as an undifferentiated stream of "criminality," we are more accustomed to consider the forms of deviation and to estimate the future results of adopting various policies toward them. Behavioral studies have provided many procedures capable of being applied by the person or the group intent upon bringing normative standards into the context of specific human situations. As with free association, the contribution may be toward reducing obsessions and compulsions that distort good intentions. Or the procedure may make it possible to take a wider circle of people, with their distinctive thoughts and feelings, into consideration.

The fact has been emphasized that the impact of the behavioral sciences has been a by-product of the pursuit, customary among scientists, of descriptive knowledge. To some extent, of course, studies have been aimed at the analysis of undesirable situations and the development of strategies of abatement. This raises no problems of a novel nature for those who are engaged in science. It is

standard practice for scientific work to start with a cancer or with a question about the nutrition of tissues in general. So differentiated is the existing body of theory, so voluminous are the available findings, and so diversified are the instruments of observation, that any starting point quickly involves the context as a whole. Within the broad field of physiological knowledge lie numerous specializations. It is evident that one major frame of reference is the pathology of living entities.

It is becoming clearer that among behavioral studies there is room for many frames of reference. Some may run parallel to the role of medicine in physiology or general biology. The point of departure may be a normative assumption, the aim being to discover the factors that condition the realization of a goal, and to encourage the invention of strategies by which results may be most economically achieved. Our overriding concern is with the norms of human dignity; and we can give them working specification. Within such assumptions it is practicable to mobilize the "policy sciences of democracy." In this way the impact of the behavioral disciplines can be kept more closely related to the ideal norms to which we are committed.

When we consider the application of scientific knowledge as a whole, a remarkable contrast appears to distinguish the behavioral from the physical sciences. It is the physical sciences and technologies that have been heavily exploited by the antidemocratic elements of civilization. Remarkably little use has been made, by these forces, of behavioral knowledge. No doubt this is largely a matter of relative richness. In the next few years, if the behavioral sciences are more strikingly successful, antidemocratic elements may also take command of the results. Per-

haps, however, we are dealing with a continuing characteristic of the application of knowledge to policy. The most distinctive procedures at the disposal of the behavioral sciences are persuasive. To the extent that reliance is put upon coercive instruments, control is surrendered to the engineer and the physical scientist. In an interdependent world it is easy to see that coercion breeds concentration of control in governmental, economic, and, indeed, in all social institutions. Persuasion, on the other hand, is more open to competitive influences, more amenable to the undermining effect of word-of-mouth communication and to the diversifying result of new initiatives. There appears to be a sense, therefore, in which democratic processes are more intimately tied up with the behavioral sciences than with other kinds of scientific knowledge.

The dependence is more apparent in connection with the methods by which individuals and groups seek and obtain understanding and insight. By "understanding" we mean information about the self and others that can be obtained without the necessity of overcoming barriers of anxiety. "Insight," on the other hand, depends upon the overcoming of anxiety barriers, upon enduring the anxieties generated when unconscious processes are admitted to conscious awareness. Understanding, for instance, is furthered by statistical surveys or records of social interaction; insight comes from the "private anguish of the mind" during the pursuit of self-knowledge by methods of free association.

Behavioral sciences are coming to put a great deal of emphasis upon the cultivation of the self. In part this comes from the reliance that must be placed upon the individual as an observer. The field work upon which modern studies of personali-

ty and culture depend produces data in the form of notes taken by the scientist in his role as interviewer or as a participant in the routines of everyday life. Wherever the observer's notes are supplemented by recording instruments, the fulness of the disclosure available for an instrument usually depends upon the skill with which an interview is conducted. Anthropologists, students of particular communities, or investigators of the operation of specific institutions (like De Tocqueville or Bryce) have always recognized their affinity with the naturalists who take themselves to the ends of the earth in order to look upon the face of nature. They have learned to look at themselves with increasing candor as improvable instruments of a vast enterprise of observation. They come to see themselves, in a "manifold of events," as events within a field of potentially observable events. The descriptive aim is to produce a body of statements that refer accurately to the salient events in the context. These events are in part subjective and hence include the expectations, demands, and identities of all who participate in the situation, together with the patterning of these perspectives into ideological systems of faith, belief, and loyalty. These events are in part non-subjective and include all the operations by which interactions go forward (as communication or collaboration). Perspectives and operations constitute the "practices" of individuals; and they conform to or deviate from the standard patterns of a given social context (which includes all institutions, organized and unorganized, by which values are shaped and shared).

It appears that behavioral knowledge relates to and is peculiarly dependent upon the human personality. This is true in a deeper sense than that knowledge

of physical nature permits us to exert an expanding degree of control over physical events. When we hear that gravitational laws are known, we take it as settled (subject to further refinement and generalization). If we contemplate the possibility of interplanetary voyaging, we expect to work within the frame of knowledge about gravitational fields. But when we hear that behavioral research shows that middle classes exhibit unconscious bias against upper or lower classes, or that they are addicted to punitive demands based upon unconscious sadism, our response to this knowledge may have rather different results. If we are middle class, we may ask whether we choose to possess and to express such perspectives in the future. Possibly our choice is to liquidate the current orientation, and we take the steps necessary to modify ourselves sufficiently to live up to the choice. This means that anyone who observes us in the future may formulate different laws of the impact of the class factor on bias, since the relationship will itself be changed. By bringing descriptive knowledge of our own past to the focus of our own attention, we are adopting a procedure whose effect can be to modify the interdependencies that have been observed to hold true in the past.

The inference is that, while the behavioral sciences conform to the logic common to all science, the laws formulated at any given time may not continue to hold for future events. Our behavioral knowledge may appear to be partly falsified as a prediction of the future, thanks to the contribution that it makes to in-

sight; the process of insight may shape the sequence in which conduct unfolds through the future. Clearly, insight is a more important function of social knowledge than prediction.

The behavioral sciences are providing us with instruments capable of performing the intelligence function upon which individual and collective choices can be most rationally based. Institutions of self-survey can give us an image of local, regional, national, and world trends. Intensive studies made at strategic points throughout the accessible globe can disclose the strength of the factors that account for the trends. We can assess the degree of conformity between conduct and primary norms, and the cost (in terms of all values) of the sanctioning norms in obtaining conformity. We can project developments into the future and consider the policies likely to maximize our preferred values. Perhaps we shall alter our primary or sanctioning norms as a result of exposure to the flow of intelligence. Acting as responsible citizens of society, or as specialized ethicists, religionists, scientists, or men of affairs, we shall perhaps make use of procedures designed to deepen insight and understanding.

In any case the potential impact of the behavioral sciences is to give depth and scope to the interaction of norms and knowledge and to supplement the formulation of norms with the application of procedures capable of narrowing the gap between aspiration and actuality.

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NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY

I

The history of the several disciplines within the behavioral sciences can be conveniently read in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, where the story is carried to about 1930. In many ways the most satisfactory report upon a particular specialty relates to economics and weaves the details into the larger fabric of Joseph Dorfman's *The Economic Mind in American Civilization* (New York: Viking Press, Vols. I, II, 1946; Vol. III, 1949). Political science is not so fortunate, despite standard treatises upon the history of American political thought by Charles E. Merriam and others. Valuable information concerning sociology is to be found in Luther Lee Bernard and Jessie Bernard, *Origins of American Sociology: The Social Science Movement in the United States* (New York: Crowell, 1943). E. G. Boring writes *A History of Experimental Psychology* in a manner that places American developments in world perspective (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939). *One Hundred Years of American Psychiatry* was published for the American Psychiatric Association in 1944. In many ways the most helpful introduction to the separate histories is Herbert W. Schneider, *History of American Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946). Much important information is in the histories of academic centers which pioneered in the behavioral sciences (notably Johns Hopkins, Clark, Columbia, Chicago, Harvard, Yale). In 1948 Stuart Chase tried his hand at popularizing some of the newer trends in *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Inquiry into the Science of Human Relations* (New York: Harper, 1948).

For orientation toward modern behavioral research the two following books of readings are useful: Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (2d ed.; New York: Knopf, 1953), and G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology* (rev. ed.; New York: Holt, 1952).

The best-known book of Elton Mayo is *The Human Problem of an Industrial Civilization* (New York: Macmillan, 1933). W. Lloyd Warner made a brief statement of his work on

class and caste structures in *American Life, Dream and Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). The methods of sociometry, describing, among other relationships, the degrees of congeniality that prevail among members of a group, are outlined in Jacob L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive? Foundations of Sociometry, Group Psychology, and Sociodrama* (Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House, 1953). Kurt Lewin initiated experimental studies of dictatorially or democratically functioning groups. See Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates,'" *Journal of Social Psychology*, X (1939), 271-99. The degree to which individuals of various cultural, class, and personality traits become identified with political ideologies or with political careers is investigated in studies like these: Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954); H. J. Eysenck, *Political Personality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954).

The rectitude value has been described and explained by many methods, as in J. C. Flügel, *Man, Morals, and Society: A Psychoanalytical Study* (New York: International Universities Press, 1945) and *Men and Their Motives* (New York: International Universities Press, 1947); H. L. Hollingsworth, *Psychology and Ethics: A Study of the Sense of Obligation* (New York: Ronald, 1949); and J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press). When well-being relations go astray, the result may be psychosomatic difficulties. See Franz Alexander and T. M. French, *Psychosomatic Medicine* (New York: Ronald, 1948). There are many tests available for describing latent capacity and performance which may be obtained from reputable publishers.

With reference to enlightenment, individuals differ greatly in the scope of the information relating to the environment to which they have learned to attach importance. See E. A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XII (1948), 280-315. An experimental procedure for studying the effect of the flow of information on small groups is summarized in Alex Bavelas, "Communica-

tion Patterns in Task-oriented Groups," in D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences: Research Developments in Scope and Method* (Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1951), chapter x. A dramatic situation in which the fighting zeal of active forces was sustained by a "play-by-play" account of the operation in which they were engaged is described by John Mason Brown, *To All Hands: An Amphibious Adventure* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1943).

If an orientation is desired toward the eight categories for the analysis of values and institutions referred to here, the reader may turn to H. D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework of Political Inquiry* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950); Myres S. McDougal, "International Law, Power, and Policy," *Hague Académie de Droit International: Recueil des cours*, LXXXII (1953), 137-259. On descriptive value analysis in general see Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and Classification," in *Toward a General Theory of Action*, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pages 388-433.

II

A thoroughly documented statement of jurisprudence from a modern orientation is Julius Stone, *Province and Function of Law as Logic, Justice, and Social Control* (Sydney, Australia: Associated General Publishers, 1946). Leon Petrazyski's *Law and Morality* has now been translated as Volume VII of the "20th Century Continental Legal Philosophy Series." Concerning "sanction law" see George H. Dession, "Deviation and Community Sanctions," H. D. Lasswell, "Legislative Policy, Conformity and Psychiatry," and L. Z. Friedman, "Conformity and Non-conformity," chapters i-iii of *Psychiatry and Law*, ed. Paul H. Hoch and Joseph Zubin for the American Psychopathological Association (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1955). For general orientation consult Jerome Hall, *General Principles of Criminal Law* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1947); M. S. Guttmacher and H. Weithofen, *Psychiatry and the Law* (New York: Norton, 1952).

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praise the full significance of cultural diversity, it is essential to look into the data, interpretations, and applications of modern anthropology. An important compendium is A. L. Kroeber *et al.*, *Anthropology Today: An Encyclopedic Inventory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). See further E. A. Hoebel, *The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954). Layman and specialist enjoy the insight and verve of Bronislaw Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (first published in 1926). A lucid and mature exposition is Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953).

The process of socialization is analyzed on a global scale in John Whiting and Irwin L. Child, *Child Training and Personality: A Cross-cultural Study* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953). See further Margaret Mead and Martha Wolfenstein, *Childhood in Contemporary Cultures* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); *Manual of Child Psychology*, ed. Leonard Carmichael (New York: Wiley, 1946).

The punitive response is treated in Svend Ranulf, *The Jealousy of the Gods and Criminal Law at Athens: A Contribution to the Sociology of Moral Indignation* (2 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1933-34); Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, *Punishment and Social Structure* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935); T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Standford, *Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950). On family discipline and character formation note the systematic statement by Nelson N. Foote and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Identity and Interpersonal Competence: A New Direction in Family Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), and the stimulating work of David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950). See further the fundamental reorientations to be found in the writings of Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm.

III

The most vivid approach to the method of free association is provided by Sigmund Freud in his classic *Introduction to the Interpretation of Dreams* and the *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Anna Freud's book on *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* was a turning point in the development of the subject, since

it drew attention to the processes of perception. Karen Horney's *Self-analysis* was published in 1942 (New York: Norton). So far as the scientific acceptance of psychoanalysis is concerned, the reader will find it profitable to read E. R. Hilgard, L. S. Kubie, and E. Pumpian-Mindlin on *Psychoanalysis as Science* (Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1950).

Since interviewing procedures are of great importance to behavioral scientists, many technical studies center around the method. For example: Herbert H. Hyman *et al.*, *Interviewing in Social Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook, *Research Methods in Social Relations* (2 vols.; New York: Dryden, 1951).

The study of communication has expanded with phenomenal rapidity in recent years. The following books of readings are helpful introductions: Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, *Readings in Public Opinion and Communication* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950); Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright, Samuel Eldersveld, and Alfred McClung Lee, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York: Dryden, 1954). See also George A. Miller, *Language and Communication* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951).

In regard to primary group activities with a therapeutic or an ethical orientation see S. R. Slavson, *The Practice of Group Therapy* (New York: International Universities Press, 1947); Carl R. Rogers and Rosalind F. Dymond (eds.), *Psychotherapy and Personality Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

Legal norms in the United States recognize the individual's right to privacy. The problem rises in connection with the conduct of police investigations, especially when the question is how far the policy may go, and by what procedure, in searching for evidence of an illegal act. A bitterly contested issue is the tapping of telephones and eavesdropping. The classical article on "The Right to Privacy" is Warren and Brandeis in the *Harvard Law Review* (1890). Concerning broader issues see Lasswell, "The Threat to Privacy," chapter xi of *Conflict of Loyalties*, ed. R. M. MacIver (New York: Harper, 1952).

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D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences: Research Developments in Scope and Method* (Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1951), see especially the following chapters: "The Policy Orientation" by Lasswell (chap. i); "The Person: Subject and Object of Science and Policy" by E. R. Hilgard and D. Lerner (chap. ii); "Social Scientists and Research Policy" by Robert K. Merton and D. Lerner (chap. xvi). Further: Robert K. Merton, "Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy," chapter vi of *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949).

Research in the behavioral sciences has frequently been inspired by the need to analyze and devise strategies of control for problems of public policy. The problem need not be ephemeral, nor is it necessary for the methods of gathering, processing, or interpreting data to be superficial or distorted by bias. This depends upon the integrity and the competence of the scientist. The National Bureau of Economic Research is an important instance of a private research organization devoted to the analysis of a single problem, namely, the business cycle. Under the leadership of Wesley C. Mitchell and his successors, the Bureau has published scores of volumes and stimulated the invention of policies designed to counteract tendencies toward depression or inflation.

The work of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardner Means on *The Modern Corporation* (New York: Macmillan, 1933) is a striking example of research that confronted the conventional image of an institution with a new and factually grounded conception. The institution was "property"; it has been undergoing profound change, and an awareness of the trend poses problems of policy for the body politic. Much behavioral research is of this "fantasy-reality" character, since it brings to the focus of community attention knowledge of hitherto unnoted discrepancies between ideology and operational facts. This is one of the chief contributions of research on governments, political parties, and pressure organizations. The normative conceptions currently propagated in the schools, for instance, are open to correction when they are interpreted as accounts of "actuality" rather than as ideal aspirations. In the field of political parties the work of A. N. Holcombe, V. O. Key, Jr., and Harold F. Gosnell may be cited as examples (for instance, Key, *Southern Politics* [New York: Knopf, 1949]). Studies of voting behavior conducted by Harold

F. Gosnell, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and others are heightening the tension between conventional images of the voter and the functional facts. The foundation is being laid for policy acts designed to narrow the gap—by changing the conventional image or the facts.

Almost any survey of the perspectives that prevail in different parts of the world or in social class strata will correct and stabilize the image of how norms and facts are related to one another. A current instance is the report by Samuel A. Stouffer on what people believe about civil liberties. But the regular services of the survey agencies are always performing this function on a certain scale.

The importance of insight and understanding has received greater recognition as the years pass. Lawrence K. Frank was one of the first articulate formulators of the place of the new behavioral sciences in social reconstruction. The urge toward precise formulation may be reaching a limit of fruitfulness, leaving further advance possible to the thinker who widens and deepens his experience by the procedure of observing himself and also a diversity of cultures, epochs, social strata, and personality patterns. Arne Naess, of the University of Oslo, has plumbed the useful limits of precise statement in *Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to the Theory of Communication* (Oslo, 1953).